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Case No. 18107 
BRIEF OF J. P. KOCH, INC. 
Nature of the Case 
J.P. Koch, Inc., Respondent in this appeal (hereinafter 
referred to as "Koch"), agrees with the Statement of the Nature 
of the Case contained in the Brief of Malouf Investment Company, 
Appellant herein (herei~after referred to as "Malouf"). 
Disposition in Lower Court 
Before answering or otherwise pleading to Malouf's Complaint, 
Koch filed a Motion to Dismiss Malouf's Complaint as against it, 
asserting that Malouf's. Complaint failed to state a claim against 
Koch upon which relief could be granted for the reason of lack of 
privity between Malouf and Koch. The Court granted the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
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Relief Sought on Appeal 
Koch respectfully requests that the appeal of Malouf be 
dismissed as it has not been brought pursuant to entry of a 
final judgment. In the alternative, Koch requests that the 
action taken by the lower court be affirmed in all respects. 
Further, Koch requests that it be awarded its costs incurred 
on appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
Koch adds to Malouf's Statement of Facts the statement that 
"the real estate trade referred to in the first paragraph of 
Malouf's Statement of Facts was between Malouf and Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, who, in turn, acquired 
the building from Roger Boyer and Kem c. Gardner," which facts 
are set forth in Malouf's Complaint at Paragraph 3. Koch does 
not controvert the remainder of Malouf's Statement of Facts 
regarding the allegations made in Malouf's Complaint and the 
disposition in the lower court. 
Argument 
I 
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE LOWER COURT 
WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER AND, THEREFORE, 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL HAS NOT 
BEEN CONFERRED UPON THIS COURT BY RULE 72, 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Malouf's Docketing Statement, at Paragraph 1, states that 
"Rule 72, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for an appeal 
to the Supreme Court from all final orders and judgments," and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
relies upon this portion of Rule 72 as the authority believed 
to confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear the appeal. 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of 
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the court that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon 
an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment. In the absence of such determination 
and direction, any order or other form of 
decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of 
the parties shall not terminate the action 
as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
6rder or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
As set forth in Malouf 's Statement of Facts, Malouf brought 
this action against Roger Boyer, Kem c. Gardner and Koch. The 
Order of Dismissal entered by the lower court as to Koch adjudi-
cates the liabilities of fewer than all the parties. There being 
no express direction for the entry of judgment by the lower court, 
the Order of Dismissal is not a final order upon which jurisdic-
tion to hear this appeal has been conferred upon this Court by 
Rule 72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536, 537 
(Utah 1979), this Court set forth constitutional, statutory and 
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case law in support of its dismissal of an appeal of a judgment 
in favor of one, but less than all, of the defendants in an action, 
The Court stated: 
In the case at hand, the order entered by the 
trial court clearly was not a final order. 
The action against other defendants and Rosen-
berger' s cross-claim remains alive. 
• • • • 
The order appealed from in this case was 
entered by the trial court without a Rule 54 
(b) determination, and this Court has not 
entered an order pursuant to Rule 72(b), per~ 
mitting an interlocutory appeal. 
• • • • 
The lost time and effort occasioned by the 
briefing and oral argument in this case is a 
small price to pay for insisting that the 
parties comply with the rules of procedure 
so that the proper relationship between this 
court and the trial court may be maintained. 
The reasoning set forth in Kennedy, supra, is directly applicable 
to the instant appeal, which should also be dismissed. 
II 
SECTION 70A-2-318, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
DOES NOT GRANT MALOUF A CAUSE OF ACTION 
UPON ANY WARRANTY OF KOCH BECAUSE MALOUF 
CANNOT BE A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY. 
Malouf acquired a building as the result of a real property 
trade with Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, who 
had purchased the building from Roger Boyer and Kem c. Gardner, 
who were the original owners of the building in which Koch, as the 
construction subcontractor, installed heating and air conditioni~ 
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Therefore, the question of the extension of any warranty on the 
part of Koch to Malouf depends upon the law regarding vertical, 
as opposed to horizontal, privity. 
The problem of privity of contract in breach 
of warranty actions is met on two planes. 
The issue of horizontal privity raises the 
question whether persons other than the buyer 
of defective goods can recover from the 
buyer's immediate seller on a warranty theory. 
On the other hand, the question of vertical 
privity is whether parties in the distributive 
chain prior to the immediate seller can be 
held liable to the ultimate purchaser for loss 
caused by the defective product. Section 2-318 
of the Uniform Commercial Code does not pur-
port to deal with vertical privity and Official 
Comment 3 to Section 2-318 states specifically 
that the section is not intended to enlarge or 
restrict the developing case law on whether the 
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who re-
sells, extend to other persons in the distribu-
tive chain. Thus, at the outset of any case 
dealing with horizontal privity lies the pre-
requisite that the buyer himself could have 
maintained the action for breach of warranty 
against the given defendant under the ruling 
case law of a particular jurisdiction. Annot. 
100 A.L.R. 3d, 743 at 749 (1980}. 
The version of Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
adopted in the State of Utah is intended to extend a seller's 
warranty not only to his buyer, but to any person who may reason-
ably be expected to use his buyer's goods. Once the seller's 
immediate buyer resells the goods (a vertical transfer), he pre-
eludes any subsequent third-party or horizontal beneficiary of 
that warranty. Any further extension of the seller's warranty 
must be based upon vertical privity. Thus, where Malouf is itself 
a buyer, it must rely upon the common law of vertical privity to 
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establish any warranty coverage. Malouf is not a third-party 
beneficiary of any warranty coverage which may have been extended 
to another party prior to Malouf in the vertical chain of sales. 
III 
ASSUMING KOCH WAS DEEMED A "SELLER" 
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, THERE WOULD STILL BE 
NO PRIVITY AS BETWEEN KOCH AND MALOUF. 
Malouf's Brief, at Pages 8 and 9, cites Carver v. Denn, 117 
u. 180, 214 P.2d 118 (1950), in support of the proposition that 
Koch is a "seller," as opposed to a mere installer of the heati~ 
and air conditioning system, a proposition which is not at issue 
in this appeal. 
Malouf has deleted a sentence from its citation, which 
sentence sets forth the crucial factor in distinguishing Carver 
from the factual situation in this appeal. The citation follows, 
with Malouf's deletion underlined: 
We believe the activies of the plaintiff 
amounted to considerably more than those 
of a mere installer. It is true that he 
did the installation work, and that he 
was called in to give an estimate on what 
the installation would cost. But in his 
estimate he included the cost of all the 
equipment to be used in the installation 
and he provided and sold all of the equip-
ment, presumably at a prof it, which the 
defendant agreed to purchase. The equip-
ment and the labor were charged by the 
plaintiff to the defendant, and the defen-
dant is not indebted to anyone else for 
any of the equipment installed. We fail 
to see how the plaintiff can be the seller 
for the purpose of receiving the prof its 
from the transaction and then successfully 
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establish himself a mere installer for the 
purpose of avoiding the responsibilities 
of a seller. 
Even if Koch was a "seller," as opposed to an installer, Malouf 
has not claimed that Koch sold the air conditioning and heating 
systems to Malouf. Thus, although Koch may have been a "seller," 
that assumption adds nothing as far as evidencing any vertical 
privity as between Koch and Malouf. 
IV 
THE RULING CASE LAW OF THIS JURISDIC-
TION PROVIDES NO PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD 
ALLOW MALOUF TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR 
BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST KOCH. 
Malouf's Brief cites Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d, 683 at 687, in 
support of the proposition that the requirement of privity is 
diminishing. The citation refers to "the action for personal 
injury" and "to the cases where the defective product causes 
injury to other property," and concluded that in these instances, 
the distinction between warranty and tort has been subsumed by 
action~ for strict liability in tort. Neither injury to person 
nor property is alleged in the case on appeal. 
If this action had been brought on the ground of strict lia-
bility in tort, which it was not, Malouf would still not be able 
to establish a right to recovery as against Koch. 
In Ernest w. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 158 
(Utah 1979), this Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability 
in tort, as set forth in Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of 
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Torts. Section 402A allows recovery for physical harm to a user 
or his property, neither of which has been alleged in this case, 
and applies to "unreasonably dangerous" products, such danger not 
having been alleged in this case. 
In Hahn, supra at 157, this Court cited Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 
897 (1963), as set forth in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 
2d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), which was again 
cited by Malouf in its Brief at Page 8. The citation reads: 
we fastened strict liability on a manufac-
turer who placed on the market a defective 
product even though both privity and 
notice of breach of warranty were lacking. 
The Court went on to state: 
We rejected both contract and warranty 
theories, express or implied, as the basis 
for liability. 
The instant case was brought on a warranty theory which was 
rejected as the basis for liability in Greenman. The "Greenman 
Rule" was the rule later adopted as Section 402A, Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (see Hahn, supra at 156), and which, as has 
been discussed, is inapplicable to this case. 
Annot. 16 A.L.R. 3d 683 at 687 (1967), cited by Malouf, re-
garding the diminishing requirement of privity, goes on to state: 
There remains considerable doubt as to the 
liability of the privity concept insofar 
as it applies to a cause of action by the 
ultimate purchaser against a manufacturer 
or other person in the chain of product 
distribution, where the only damage claimed 
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is that resulting to the product itself, 
or consequential damage flowing from the 
defective condition otherwise than by a 
violent accident causing injury to a per-
son or to other property. 
t 
Malouf's Brief has cited no case law wherein this Court has 
ruled that the requirement of privity as between the ultimate 
purchaser and another person in the chain of product distribu-
tion has been dispensed within a breach of warranty claim. The 
n better reasoned cases in surrounding jurisdictions have ruled 
~: 
~I 
that the vertical privity requirement may not be ignored. These 
cases include Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 592 P.2d 631 (Wash. 
1979); Davis v. Homasote Co., 574 P.2d 1116 (Ore. 1978); Salmon 
River Sportsman Camps Inc. v. Cessna Air Co., 544 P.2d 306 (Ida. 
1975), and Eck v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., ·453 P.2d 366 (Ariz. 
1969). Furthermore, authority contra, for example, Old Albany 
Estates v. Highland Carpet Mills, 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979), is 
concerned with removing the middlemen as obstacles between the 
manufacturer and the ultimate purchasers in the chain of product 
distribution. 
In this case, the "chain of product distribution" had ended 
before Malouf's purchase. The product had been sold to, and used 
by, Roger Boyer and Kem C. Gardner, the initial consumers, and 
then resold to and used by Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company before being traded to Malouf. The policy 
considerations in those cases not requiring vertical privity so 
as to prevent a manufacturer from shielding itself by the use of 
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middlemen are not present here. Such considerations should not 
be extended so as to eliminate the requirement of privity despite 
an indefinite number of resales and trades of used property after 
having left the "chain of product distribution." 
Summary 
The Appeal of Malouf should be dismissed for the reason that 
it has not been taken pursuant to entry of a final Order and, 
therefore, jurisdiction to hear the appeal has not been conferred 
upon this Court by Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Malouf cannot claim that it need not establish vertical 
privity in a breach of warranty claim by invocation of Section 
70A-2-318, Utah Code Annotated. Section 70A-2-318 applies to 
horizontal privity only and, thus, is inapplicable to this 
case. 
Whether or not Koch is a "seller," as opposed to an "in-
staller," has no effect upon this appeal. Admittedly, Koch did 
not sell to Malouf and, thus, there is a lack of vertical privity. 
There is no case law in this jurisdiction holding that verti-""""""' 
cal privity is not to be required in a claim by a consumer upon a 
seller in a breach of warranty action. Where, as in this case, 
the consumer is not within the "chain of product distribution," 
there is no policy consideration which would indicate that such a 
holding would be appropriate. 
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Conclusion 
Koch respectfully submits that the appeal of Malouf should 
be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the action taken by 
the lower court should be affirmed in all respects and that Koch 
should be awarded its costs incurred in this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1982. 
. . ..... , 
f /' 
__ ..... -· 
Ri~hard H. Moffat , ~, 
Attorney for J. P. Koah, Inc. 
Cristo ei J{ Burke 
Attorney for J. P. Koch, Inc. 
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